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Abstract
The 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) infected
over 8,000 people and killed 784 leaving many questions concerning the effectiveness of
common household disinfectants and antiseptics at preventing viral transmission. In order
to determine how well standard disinfectants and detergents were at eliminating viral
particles from surfaces, the antiviral action of triclosan, pine oil, bleach, chloroxylenol
and quaternary ammonium compound/ethanol based products were assayed against
Murine Hepatitis Virus (MHV), a virus genetically similar to SARS. Using the
Environmental Protection Agency (EPA) guidelines for the virucidal assay, it was
determined that alkyl dimethyl benzyl ammonium saccharinate in 79% ethanol (Lysol
Disinfectant Spray®), chloroxylenol (Dettol Liquid Antiseptic -Disinfectant®), sodium
hypochlorite (household bleach), triclosan (Clean & Smooth Soap®) and pine oil (PineSol®) were effective against MHV when used at the recommended concentrations.
Products were then diluted outside of the recommended range and were assayed to
determine the efficacy of these products when used incorrectly. Three of these products,
alkyl dimethyl benzyl ammonium saccharinate in 79% ethanol (Lysol Disinfectant
Spray®), triclosan (Clean & Smooth Soap®), and sodium hypochlorite (household
bleach), when used incorrectly, did not demonstrate complete inactivation of MHV and
the presence of MHV infection was detectable after product treatment.
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Introduction
The Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) virus infected 8098 people and
killed 774 in 2003 (1). Since SARS was a new emerging disease there was no known
medical treatment or vaccine available to prevent further cases or to help the infected
survive. The only means of containing the viral outbreak was to practice isolation,
infection control and follow the etiology of the virus, practices that have been performed
for centuries (2). SARS was discovered in March of 2003 and shortly after was classified
as a member of the family of viruses known as Coronaviridae (3). The emergence of the
virus is believed to have begun in the Guangdong province of China in November of
2002 (1, 4, 5, and 6). Many techniques were used to discover the etiological agent of the
SARS virus including cell culture, RT-PCR, electron microscopy, histopathological
examination and serological analysis (5 and 7). The focus of the search was largely on
respiratory agents and those viruses that target the lower respiratory tract (5). In an
attempt to isolate the virus, successful infection was achieved using the Vero E6 cell line
and within 24 - 48 hours the viral cytopathogenic effect was seen (4, 5). Electron
microscopy revealed a distinct ring formed by the helical nucleoplasmid and spikes on
the viral envelope, both of these attributes distinct to Coronaviruses (2).
Because of its enveloped outer membrane and viral RNA, it was initially
believed that SARS most resembled the viruses from Group II of the Coronaviridae (2).
Although, recent phylogenetic analyses has suggested that SARS is equally distantly
related to any of the groups and belongs in a new group, Group IV (8 and 9). SARS and
Murine Hepatitis Virus (MHV) share many structural and genetic similarities. For
example, both viruses contain two overlapping Open Reading Frames (ORF) known as

6

ORF la and ORF lb, which are important to initiate translation (10 and 11). Both viruses
also show similar genome organization (11). However, there are also differences
between the two viruses including the replicase gene which, in MHV, encodes three
proteinases and in SARS only encodes two proteinases. These proteinases are important
for the cleavage of polyproteins into mature proteins which are necessary for virus
transcription (10). Another critical difference is that while SARS is a bio safety level
(BSL)-3 agent, MHV can be studied in a BSL-2 facility. Thus, analysis of MHV may
serve to answer questions about SARS more quickly and without the need to set up
complex research facilities.
Coronaviruses
Coronaviruses are from the order Nidovirales and the family Coronaviridae.
They are large, enveloped, positive stranded RNA viruses ranging from 27 to 32 kb (4, 8
and 11 - 14). Coronaviridae consist of two genera: Coronaviruses and Toroviruses. They
differ by their virion morphology, the genome length and also, the Toroviruses only
infect animals (12 and 14). Coronaviruses, for the most part, cause respiratory and enteric
diseases in humans and in animals (4). They have the largest genome known of all the
RNA viruses and they also share a very high recombination frequency (12). The name
corona (Latin for crown) was attributed to Coronaviruses because their envelope is
studded with long spikes which look like a crown (12).
There are three different serological groups in the Coronaviridae, antigenic
groups I, II and III. They were first separated based on serological testing and now they
are separated based on similar genomic sequences, host range, antigenic relationships and
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the organization of the genome (4). The first two groups contain mammalian viruses and
the third group only contains avian viruses as listed below (4).
Antigenic group I: HCoV229E, Human Coronavirus -229E; TGEV, Porcine
transmissible gastroenteritis virus; PRCoV, porcine respiratory Coronavirus; CCoV,
canine Coronavirus; FIPV, feline infectious peritonitits virus; FECov, feline enteric
Coronavirus; RBCo V, rabbit Coronavirus
Antigenic group II: MHV, mouse hepatitis virus; HCoV-OC43, Human Coronavirus OC43; HEV, porcine hemagglutinating encephalomyelitis; TCoV, turkey Coronavirus;
SDAV, sialodacryoadenitis virus; BCoV, bovine Coronavirus
Antigenic group III: IBV, avian infectious bronchitis virus; TCoV, turkey Coronavirus
In figure 1, some of the Coronaviruses are illustrated in a phylogenetic tree to better
illustrate how closely related the different Coronaviruses are and the different antigenic
groups there are. A DNA microarray was designed to determine if this novel virus was
associated to an existing viral family. The strongest results yielding the best hybridizing
elements were to the Coronaviridae and the Astroviridae (3). These results were further
analyzed to determine the genetic identity to the existing viruses in that family. A
BLAST analysis using 157 amino acids of the nucleocapsid resulted in a 33 % identity to
MHV (3). In animals, Coronaviruses can lead to virulent respiratory, enteric, hepatitis
and neurological diseases also some types of Coronaviruses can cause severe systemic
diseases resulting in death (2). In humans, Groups 1 and 2 used to be associated with mild
respiratory illnesses until SARS (15 and 16). About 30% of all upper respiratory
illnesses is caused by two types of Human Coronaviruses, HCoV-229E found in group 1
and HCoV-OC43 found in group 2 (4, 13, 17 and 18). The SARS virus is unlike other
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Coronaviruses because of the effect it had on the lower respiratory tract and how it
caused disease in more than one host species (17). Data have suggested that the SARS
virus is the first virus to be grouped in a new serological group labeled as group IV (19).
The structural proteins such as the spike, nucleocapsid, membrane and small membrane
proteins seemed to have less sequence conservation as compared to the enzymatic
proteins such as helicase and polymerase. This suggests SARS should be classified in its
own distinct group (4). These studies also suggest that SARS originated from a non
human host and jumped the species barrier to infect humans (17). But other studies
analysis suggest that the virus is most likely a split-off of group II because of genetic
similarity that could have occurred by recombination of two human Coronaviruses or an
animal and a Human Coronavirus or even mutations in an existing human Coronavirus
that led to newly acquired virulence factors (10 and 17). There are other human
Coronaviruses not diagrammed below such as HC0V-OCI6, HCoV-OC37 and HCoVOC48 which are known to cause colds in humans but animal models or cell culture
cannot be utilized as methods to study these viruses and therefore a method does not exist
for studying these viruses (20).
Group I
Figure 1. Phylogenetic tree o f different
Porcine epidemie ¿tante» v«w

Coronaviruses (2).
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Structure of Coronaviruses
Coronaviruses have five different structural proteins to aid with the formation of
the virion (12). The spikes on the surface of Coronaviruses are formed by the spike (S)
glycoprotein. This formation leads to a distinct crown which is an attribute to the
Coronaviridae. The S protein is further divided into three different groups, external
domain, transmembrane domain and a carboxylterminal cytoplasmic domain (12). The
external spike glycoproteins, SI and S2, are involved with the formation of the spike. The
SI protein is involved with the structure of the globular portion and the S2 protein forms
the rod below the globular portion. The SI protein mutates frequently and therefore is
believed not to have a conserved sequence whereas the S2 protein is believed to be more
of a conserved structure because of the lack of mutations (12). The SI protein is
responsible for binding to the specific receptors on other cells. Due to the fact that the
sequences are not conserved in the SI protein and deletions and mutations are common
allows for the protein to alter the antigenicity and the pathogenicity of the virus (12).
During virus maturation for MHV the S protein is cleaved and the S1 and S2 remain as
the spike but non-covalently bound. It is believed that this cleavage allows for improved
cell fusion and viral infectivity (12). Some of the viruses in the antigenic group I do not
allow for the cleavage of the S protein which means the cell fusion and viral infectivity
occur not as efficiently.
The hemagglutinin-esterase (HE) glycoprotein form smaller spikes on the
surface of the viral particles (12). They are not present in the viruses from the
Coronaviridae antigenic group I and are only present in some of the group II and group
III viruses. The HE protein is believed to have been introduced into the Coronaviruses by
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recombination with the mRNA encoding for the HE of influenza C (12 and 17). There is
about a 30% sequence similarity between the Coronaviruses and Influenza C viruses HE
protein (12). When present, the HE protein is involved in hemagglutinin and
hemadsorption which allows for the virus to adhere to the red blood cells and cause the
cells to agglutinate. It is believed that the HE protein might also have involvement in
viral entry and release. The HE protein in some of the viruses from group II along with
the presence of the S protein has demonstrated initial binding of the virus to the host cell.
Serial passaging of these group II viruses that contain the HE protein can lead to the
deletion of the HE protein, concluding that this structure is not critical for virus infection
( 12).

The membrane (M) glycoprotein is associated with the envelope of the virus and
viral assembly and is involved with determining the budding site of the virus (12). Only a
small portion of the aminoterminal domain of the M protein can be found exposed
outside of the viral envelope or in some viruses like MHV this protein can also be located
internally in what is known as the internal core (12). The internal core is the structure that
surrounds the RNA genomic material.
The small membrane (E) protein is also associated with the envelope and with
the assistance of the M glycoprotein determines the budding site of the viral particle (12).
The E protein can always be found next to the M glycoprotein on the envelope of the
viral structure but the M glycoprotein can be located next to the E protein or the HE
glycoprotein. The M glycoprotein and the E protein are both required for viral assembly.
Located inside of the internal core the nucleocapsid (N) phosphoprotein interacts
with the RNA genomic material (12). This interaction of the N protein with the viral
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RNA genomic material allows for further interaction with the M protein and ultimately
the formation of viral particles (12). The N protein is known to have three conserved
domain regions, one of them being a domain that is responsible for the RNA binding
( 12).

RNA Recombination
There is a very high frequency rate of RNA recombination for Coronaviruses.
Throughout the entire Coronaviridae it was estimated that the frequency of
recombination is as high as 25% (12 and 14). MHV was the first Coronavirus that
demonstrated such a high rate of RNA recombination but now two other viruses have
been added to the list and they can also demonstrate this recombination in both in vitro
and in vivo (12). Due to this fact it is believed that development of a vaccine would not
be beneficial to the public and also very difficult to make an effective vaccine because of
the high frequency of the RNA recombination rate.
Coronavirus RNA synthesis involves a unique mechanism which allows
discontinuous RNA transcription and polymerase jumping known as the copy-choice
mechanism (12). The viral polymerase on an incomplete RNA template at some random
point switches to a different homologous RNA template and continues with the RNA
synthesis in this manner until complete (12). The RNA dependent RNA polymerase can
also generate point mutations, large deletions and even insertions of foreign RNA into the
genome and is known to be error prone (17).
RNA recombination is fundamental for the evolution of Coronaviruses. It is
believed that this is the reason for such a high RNA recombination rate. Recombination
events have led to new IBV strains by the natural association of poultry flocks with
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different viral strains (12). It is believed that the high frequency rate of RNA
recombination is one of the major contributing factors that can or has evolved into
different Coronaviruses never seen before.
Survival
Coronaviruses in general can survive for 21 days from 4° C to -80° C with a
minimal reduction in concentration and can survive beyond 21 days if the temperature is
kept at -80°C throughout this time period (2). Specifically HCoV-229E infectivity was
studied to still be possible after 3 hours of being dried on surfaces such as aluminum,
latex gloves and sterile sponges (13). This same study shows the HCoV-OC43 can only
survive 1 hour or less on the same surface (13). SARS can only survive up to 48 hours in
hospital wastewater, sewage or dechlorinated tap water (21). In feces from SARS patients
with diarrhea the virus can last up to 3 days (21). If the temperatures were kept in the
colder range than the SARS virus can persist up to 17 days in feces. The fact that SARS
and other Coronaviruses can endure for long periods of time allows for transmission to
occur successfully and disinfection of contaminated surfaces should be taken seriously.
The Signs and Symptoms
The signs and symptoms of the SARS virus include > 38° C (>100.4° F)
temperature, lower respiratory tract problems such as coughing, difficulty breathing, and
a dry cough, traveling to an area which has been noted for transmission of the disease, or
contact with an individual that has been diagnosed or is believed to have been exposed to
the SARS virus (22).
SARS cases were classified into three different groups. One group was the
suspect case group which does not fit the classic symptoms of the disease, a probable
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case group fits the classic definition of the symptoms of the disease, and a discarded case
group does not have any pathologically evidence. Cases were then diagnosed and
confirmed by laboratory tests such as viral culture, antibody tests, or PCR test. If the
results were negative they were tested 28 days later to confirm the finding (2).
Epidemiology
SARS appears to have first been noticed in the Guangdong Region of China
during November 2002 (2). From there it is believed to have taken over three months to
reach neighboring towns. This is an attribute to a disease with a very low infectious rate.
However, during the peak of the virus in May of 2003, 200 new cases were being
reported each day. The infectious rate of influenza almost 100 years ago compared to the
SARS outbreak traveled the globe faster. SARS is believed to have been taken out of the
Guangdong region by a doctor visiting Hong Kong for one night on Feb 21, 2003 at the
Hotel Metropole. This occurrence initiated the outbreak. It is believed that the origin of
SARS or a relative of this virus originated from animals and was transmitted to humans.
The Himalayan palm civets and raccoon dogs are indigenous animals to the Guangdong
Province in China and data suggest that these animals might be the origin of SARS (1, 23
and 24).
Serological assays performed on blood samples taken before 2002 suggest that
the SARS like viruses circulated throughout the human population well before the
outbreak (19 and 23). In the live animal markets in China SARS-CoV like viruses were
isolated from the Himalayan palm civets and raccoon dogs. Serological screening was
also performed on animal traders and slaughterers and these results indicated that 40% of
the traders and 20% of the slaughterers had an antibody reaction to SARS CoV or SARS
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CoV like viruses. Further, there is a close similarity between these two viruses. They only
differ by 60 to 80 nucleotides which can attribute to cross reactivity of the antibodies and
therefore not permitting the SARS virus to circulate before the 2003 outbreak (19). These
numbers are very high within the animal and human population and can be indicative of
another outbreak. The SARS CoV and animal SARS like virus as discussed previously
are related to the Coronavirus species that causes respiratory and gastrointestinal diseases
but some researchers feel they are different enough to be grouped in a new antigenic
group number IV (19). It is believed that the Coronavirus jumped the species barrier from
animals and infected humans. At some point the virus, probably through genetic deletions
or mutations, adapted to the human population and caused an outbreak (20). An
evolutionary study was performed on different proteins that make up the SARS virus
such as the replicase, spike and nucleocapsid proteins. There is significant data to suggest
a mammalian origin for the replicase protein, mammalian-avian origin for the spike
protein, and avian origin for the nucleocapsid protein (25). Still the evolution of SARS
has not been determined. An outbreak caused by a novel agent from an animal requires
extensive exposure and viral evolution to cause animal-to-human transmission that
eventually leads to human-to-human transmission. This ideal situation for an outbreak is
commonly seen in any areas that have wildlife animal markets and should be closely
monitored for animal viruses that could evolve into a pathogenic organism for humans.
The studies of confirmed SARS cases were divided into three groups: early,
middle and the late phase groups. The early phase describes the SARS cases that were
believed to have been the first cases of SARS in Nov. 2002 from the Guangdong
Province of China to the first superspreader. A superspreader event is when transmission
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of hundreds of cases can be traced back to the same person. The first superspreader event
is believed to have occurred in a hospital in Guangzhou where 130 primary and
secondary cases could be traced to one individual. Of the 130 cases, 106 of them were
hospital acquired cases. All cases from this point, including when a doctor on Feb 21,
2003 visited Hotel Metropole in Hong Kong, started the middle phase. Any case that was
confirmed a SARS case after this point falls into the late phase (2).
Prevention
Controlling the SARS outbreak was successful because of isolation, effective
contact tracing, quarantining those that were infected by the virus and global
involvement. Transmission of the disease is important for its survival and therefore it is
important to stop the transmission from an infected person to a healthy individual. Just as
important, there were more enhanced infection control procedures that were followed
such as safety measures for healthcare workers, isolating SARS patients and disinfecting
contaminated surfaces that also lead to the termination of the SARS outbreak in 2003.
Also, determining if the reservoir for the SARS virus was humans or animals was
important. A more recent paper suggests that bats are the reservoir source and the palm
civet and raccoon dog served as an amplification vessel for the virus (26). This
assessment can determine if the virus was circulating in the human population before the
outbreak or if the virus was able to jump the species barrier from animals to humans.
In a short time the World Health Organization (WHO) was able to prevent
further transmission or keep additional cases very low. Two incubation periods of a total
of 20 days were used as an indicator that the correct steps were taken to contain the
outbreak and prevent it from spreading any further. Careful surveillance of SARS was
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occurring to stop the transmission and is still taking place to prevent such an outbreak
from occurring again.
In areas where the SARS outbreak was severe, extreme measures resulted in
designating hospitals only for SARS patients, quarantining patients and using the military
to reinforce these measures. Also, closing movie theaters or other social public places
were just some of the other measures used to limit transmission. In Hong Kong, school
was cancelled from March to May 2003 (27). In Singapore, a legislation was passed to
implement all of the recommended courses of action to prevent further transmission. An
electronic picture camera was placed in homes to ensure those that were placed in
quarantine or needed to be isolated did not break this rule. In Taiwan, alone, there were
over 150,000 persons quarantined (28). The penalty for violating these rules resulted in
almost a $6000 fine and 6 months in prison (2).
In hospital settings, more stringent criteria were followed such as frequent hand
washing, wearing gloves, masks and gowns all of the time. The Centers of Disease
Control and Prevention (CDC) and WHO always recommend hand hygiene and during
the SARS outbreak frequent and careful hand hygiene was strongly insisted among
hospital care workers, who were more frequently exposed to SARS. If hands were soiled,
soap and water were used initially, and if hands were not visibly soiled an alcohol based
product was appropriate for use. In the households of suspected SARS persons it was
difficult to provide guidance to the other household members on the best control
measures because of the uncertainty of when and how the disease was transmitted.
Currently, vaccines are not available for the SARS virus but there are vaccines
for other Coronavirus species, which have been developed for animals (e.g. avian
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infectious bronchitis virus) (2 and 17). There are many problems developing a SARS
vaccine several of which were encountered while developing a vaccine for some of the
other Coronaviruses. For Coronaviruses it is difficult to develop a vaccine that provides
long term protective immunity and is safe. There is data that some vaccines against
certain Coronaviruses lead to disease enhancement (10 and 17). A live, attenuated and
recombinant virus vaccine exists for MHV.
While there is not presently a SARS vaccine available, there is a full-length
cDNA of the SARS-CoV which provides a template for manipulation of the SARS viral
genome for vaccine studies (10). This will allow for the development of a successful
vaccine or other therapeutics. Vaccines are developed triggering the spike (S) protein,
which will elicit a neutralizing antibody, or other means that affect viral replication (2,
10, 29 and 30). A current study employing the use of a recombinant vaccine modified
with the S protein of SARS-CoV and injected into ferrets resulted in a rapid neutralizing
effect compared to the controls but also led to inflammatory responses of the liver (31).
The benefit of a long lasting immunity that is associated with vaccinations does not seem
to be occurring with most types of Coronaviruses. Reinfections can occur, as seen with
HCoV-229E, but usually are milder than before (2, 10). The 2003 outbreak of SARS
ended due to the old fashioned infection control measures mentioned previously but other
therapeutics will be necessary if there ever is another severe outbreak. It has been shown
that SARS has a recombinant history leading to different viral strains by host jumping
and recombination (32). This is a highly disputed conclusion and others have claimed that
either recombination did not occur with SARS or recombination with another virus did
not occur.
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Transmission
Most Coronaviruses are transmitted through close contact or the inhalation of
infected droplets. There were two situations, the Metropole Hotel and the Amoy gardens,
that make it unclear during the outbreak if the SARS virus could have spread through
airborne transmission. Also, the majority of the SARS outbreaks occurred between
households indicating that close person-to-person contact is a means of transmission. A
SARS study demonstrated that the amount of RNA virus found in the sputum from SARS
patients had an extremely high concentration of the virus indicating that the main route of
transmission occurs from the respiratory tract (22).
Hospital care workers and doctors were among those in the high risk groups for
becoming infected and represented 21% of probable SARS cases during the outbreak
(33). Ill travelers caused SARS to spread to other areas and contributed in bringing others
in contact with the infectious disease (34). An example would be the United States of
America where only eight confirmed SARS cases were diagnosed with no hospital or
community transmission. Why were some areas able to contain the virus and others not?
Out of 20 hospitals visited by the mobile SARS containment teams only 25%
implemented the correct infection control procedures and contained the virus within the
hospital setting which did not allow it to spread to the surrounding communities (1 and
35). Infection rates in countries such as China, Taiwan, and Hong Kong where the
containment of the virus was not successful was the result of wide-spread disease
transmission (1). Proper infection control measures are one reason why some areas
experienced a low transmission rate and also there have been situations where no
transmission occurred especially among healthcare workers (36).
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SARS to date has been found in three species of animals in the Chinese market
(i.e. the masked palm civet cat, the raccoon-dog, and the Chinese ferret badger). These
animals are considered delicacies and are sold in Chinese markets. Interestingly enough,
antibody tests of those working in the market showed a higher immunity to
Coronaviruses than that of the general public (37).
In late February and early March 2003, after several hundred cases of an
atypical respiratory illness, which in most cases was diagnosed as pneumonia, Dr. Carlo
Urbani of the WHO traveled to China to investigate the matter. He was the first one
attributed to recognizing such an unusually high number of cases of atypical pneumonia
and alerted everyone of the transmissibility and lethality of this outbreak. In mid-March
when similar cases were identified in Canada, Hong Kong and Vietnam the WHO issued
a global alert for what was first identified as SARS (4).
The first outbreak of the 21st century heightened awareness of the need to be
able to rely on common household products to prevent transmission of emerging
pathogens. In order to specifically prove that these disinfectants are efficacious is to
choose the right surrogates with which to study. In the US, products must be registered
with the EPA in order to claim that they kill germs or are disinfectants against certain
organisms. This procedure ensures that US household products have met the disinfectant
testing requirements, followed the registration process and the claims on the label of the
products are accurate.
During an outbreak the WHO recommends one wash their hands and disinfect
contaminated surfaces. This has been a usual practice and suggestion to follow during an
outbreak to prevent transmission of the disease (38 - 40). It is extremely rare for viruses
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to jump the species barrier from animals to humans but when it does occur it can be
catastrophic. As reported by Mary Wilson there are more than 300 diseases that have
their reservoir in animals and in time when these diseases jump the species barrier they
will develop to new human pathogens (41). It is more likely now then ever for these new
pathogens to make their way to the US due to the ease and frequency of human travel and
trade.
The characterization of SARS as a novel Coronavirus was determined by
comparing the genome to many known respiratory illnesses, the length, the open reading
frames and its genome organization were only a few of the determinants used to conclude
that the atypical pneumonia cases were in fact a new virus called SARS and the first
outbreak of the 21st century (3 and 4).
Test Method
During the SARS outbreak, the recommendation of disinfectants and antiseptics
to prevent transmission was one of the major steps for infection control but at the same
time the effectiveness of the products against the virus was unknown. The EPA has
specific protocols in order to claim a disinfectant has virucidal properties. In order for a
product to be registered as efficacious against a certain organism and in this case claim
that the product has an anti-viral activity, a method known as a surface test must be
followed according to the guidelines of the EPA. As previously described, the surface
method involves drying an amount of known virus on a surface and then applying the
product to the viral film for a specific contact time. The objective of this study was to
assay the effectiveness of common household disinfectant and antiseptic products against
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MHV, a virus from group II of the Coronaviridae, which in turn can be used as an
indicator of how efficacious these disinfectants and antiseptics would be against SARS.
In order to prevent another outbreak of SARS, a better understanding of how
well disinfectants prevent viral transmission via surfaces is essential. In order to
determine the antiviral activity of these common household products, a surrogate virus
was chosen appropriately and an accepted surface efficacy test using guidelines set forth
and established by a federal agency, i.e. the Environmental Protection Agency (EPA),
was performed. A surface test consists of drying a viral inoculum on a hard non-porous
surface and applying the antiviral product to this surface for a designated contact time,
neutralization and assessment for infectivity.
Materials and Methods
Cell Lines and Viruses
NCTC clone 1469 (ATCC, Manassas, VA, USA); Mouse liver cells were grown
in Dulbecco’s Modified Eagle’s Medium (ATCC, Manassas, VA, USA) with 4 mM Lglutamine adjusted to contain 1.5 g/L sodium bicarbonate and 4.5 g/L glucose with the
addition of 0.6mL/L of gentamicin (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad, CA, USA)
and 10% horse serum (ATCC, Manassas, VA, USA).
BS-C-1 (ATCC, Manassas, VA, USA); African green monkey kidney cells were
grown in Eagle’s Minimum Essential Medium (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad,
CA, USA) with 2 mM L-glutamine adjusted to contain 1.5 g/L sodium bicarbonate and
4.5 g/L with the addition of 0.6 mL/L of gentamicin (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation,
Carlsbad, CA, USA) and 10% fetal bovine serum (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation,
Carlsbad, CA, USA).
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MRC-5 (ATCC, Manassas, VA, USA); Human lung cells were grown in Eagle’s
Minimum Essential Medium (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad, CA, USA) with 2
mM L-glutamine adjusted to contain 1.5 g/L sodium bicarbonate and 4.5 g/L with the
addition of 0.6 mL/L of gentamicin (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad, CA, USA)
and 10% fetal bovine serum (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad, CA, USA).
Mouse Hepatitis Virus strain MHV-1 (Parkes), Human Coronavirus OC43
(HCoV-OC43) and Human Coronavirus 229E (HCoV-229E) were obtained from the
American Type Culture Collection (ATCC, Manassas, VA, USA).
Cell Culture
Cell lines were grown in an incubator at35.0°C + 2.5°C supplemented with 5%
C 02. The cell lines were passaged by aseptically pipetting out all of the media and the
cell surface was washed once with lx PBS (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation, Carlsbad, CA,
USA). Approximately, lmL of trypsin-EDTA (IX) liquid (Gibco Invitrogen Corporation,
Carlsbad, CA, USA) was added to the surface of the flask, spread evenly across the
surface and removed. Another lmL of trypsin-EDTA (IX) liquid (Gibco Invitrogen
Corporation, Carlsbad, CA, USA) was added to flask and gently rocked back and forth to
ensure the entire monolayer was covered. The flask was placed into the 35°C incubator
until the cells detached. The activity of the trypsin was neutralized with the addition of
the appropriate media for that cell line and 20% serum (v/v). The cell suspension was
added to T75 flasks and placed back into the incubator to allow for cell growth. For the
preparation of assay plates the cells were passaged as above but not placed into a T75
flask after detachment. The cell suspension was placed into a sterile 500mL flask with the
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appropriate amount of volume of media plus 10% serum for 24 multi-well assay plates.
2mL of this suspension was added to each well of the 24 multi-well assay plates.
Virus Stocks
Cell monolayers demonstrating >90% confluency were used to produce virus
stocks. All of the media was aseptically pipetted out of a T75 flask and 1 to 2 ml of the
thawed virus was added to the confluent cells. The flask was rocked back and forth to
ensure a complete coverage of the virus on the cell monolayer. The flask was placed in
the 35°C incubator for one to two hours for adsorption. After the adsorption period, 10
mL of media with 2% (v/v) serum was added into the flask and placed back into the
incubator until > 90% of the cell monolayer demonstrated the specific viral
cytopathogenic effect (viral CPE). This usually took 24 to 48 hours. After this period the
cell monolayer was removed from the plate using a cell scraper and the viral/cell
suspension was collected and centrifuged at 2000 RPM (CRU-5000 Centrifuge) for 10
minutes at 4°C. The supernatant was collected and serum was added so that the total
volume of serum would be 10% (v/v). lmL of this virus stock was added to cryogenic
vials (Nalgene, Rochester, NY, USA) and stored at -75°C.
EPA Virucidal Test Method
Multiwell plates (i.e. 24 well assay plates) containing the appropriate host cell
line were prepared at least one day prior to the start of the assay procedure. On the day of
the virucidal assay, growth media was aseptically removed from each well containing
target cells and replaced with 2.0 mL of media containing 2% (v/v) horse serum. Media
containing 2% (v/v) of serum (maintenance media) was used throughout the assay. The
underside of a petri plate (100 x 15mm) was marked with an area of 28cm2. An amount
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of 0.2 to 0.4 mL of virus stock was spread over this area using a lOpl inoculating loop
and allowed to dry for 30 to 50 minutes at room temperature until a white, dry film was
apparent.
Test substance samples and sample dilutions were prepared using distilled (DI)
water. For each sample tested, the test substance was applied directly to the virus film as
per the label directions, and allowed to sit undisturbed for the 30 second contact time at
an ambient temperature. After 5 seconds the virus/test substance mixture was
resuspended by scraping the plate with a sterile cell scraper. Serial ten-fold dilutions were
carried out in maintenance media (i.e. 0.2 mL of a virus dilution was added to 1.8 mL of
maintenance media). A total of 0.2 mL of each dilution was then aseptically pipetted into
each of four wells of host cells. The assay plates were incubated at 35°C + 2.5°C
supplemented with 5% CO2 and the cells were observed for toxicity or characteristic viral
cytopathogenic effect (CPE) by looking at the plates through a reverse microscope
throughout the assay. The viral CPE was characteristic of a degenerated cell sheet and
cell detachment. Maintenance media was changed after the first night of incubation by
aseptically removing all of the media and replacing it with fresh 2 mL of maintenance
medium. Additional refeedings were performed every 48-96 hours thereafter, as
necessary. This was done by aseptically removing 1 mL of medium from each well,
which had not demonstrated obvious cytotoxicity or viral CPE, and pipetting in a fresh 1
mL of sterile maintenance medium. The incubation time ranged between seven to ten
days. Infectious dose titers were determined by the method of Reed and Muench ID50
endpoint method (42). The endpoint method is comprised of a statistical model to
determine titers of viruses that could not be calculated by conventional plaque or focus
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assays. Four replicates were performed for each dilution. In order to calculate the
endpoint the cumulative number of infected and uninfected were reported in percentages.
These numbers were used to calculate the proportionate distance factor which in turn was
used along with the dilution factors to figure out the ID5o endpoint (i.e. the dilution that
resulted in an infectious dose in 50% of the inoculated replicates). The endpoint of the
test replicates were averaged between two replicates and then subtracted from the viral
titer log recovery to determine the log reduction of each test substance per test.
In order to assess the viral titer, cells were assessed for viral infectivity in the
presence of virus but in the absence of the test product. The above procedure was
repeated except utilizing 2.0 mL of virus control resuspending medium (i.e. serum-free
cell culture medium) in place of the test substance treatment. This control was used to
verify the amount of virus present on the petri plate before disinfectant treatment. This
endpoint became the log recovery and was used for all log reduction calculations.
In order to determine the effect of the test substance with the host, cells were
assessed for toxicity by the product in the absence of virus. The above procedure was
repeated utilizing 0.2 to 0.4 mL of toxicity control inoculum (i.e. cell culture medium +
10% serum) as the initial inoculum, in place of the virus stock. This control determines
the effect of the disinfectant dilutions on the host cells in the absence of virus.
Host cells were assessed for general health in the absence of virus and product
throughout the course of the assay period by ensuring the cell sheet did not detach and
degeneration was not apparent. One row of cells (i.e. 4 wells) was left untreated (i.e. no
inoculation).

26

EPA Virucidal Test Method using Sephadex Columns
Preparation o f Sephadex Columns:
At least one day prior to testing, the sephadex slurry and columns were
prepared. The sephadex slurry was prepared by adding 40 to 50g of lipophilic sephadex
(Sigma-Aldrich, St. Louis, MO, USA) to 1000 mL of PBS solution. The solution was
swirled to mix and remained in the refrigerator at least overnight. The slurry was then
autoclaved for 20-25 minutes at 121°C/15 PSI to sterilize, and allowed to cool to ambient
temperature prior to use. The columns were prepared by first inserting a small wad of
glass wool into a lOmL syringe barrel and pushing it down to cover the opening in the
syringe tip. The syringe barrel was then placed into a sterile 125 mL glass Gibco bottle,
capped and autoclaved.
Sephadex columns plus the addition of the sephadex slurry were prepared on the
day of the virucidal assay procedure. Sephadex slurry was pipetted into the barrel and
permitted to drain, allowing the sephadex to settle. Sephadex slurry was added until the
column height reached 9-1 lmL in a lOmL syringe barrel. Once the appropriate column
height was reached, the addition of lOmL of cell culture medium was added to equilibrate
the column. Prior to the start of the virucidal assay procedure, the filled columns were
centrifuged at 700-900 RPM in a CRU-5000 centrifuge with a swinging bucket rotor for
approximately 3-4 minutes to eliminate the void volume in the column.
During the neutralization step of the test substance / virus suspension or for the
controls the 2mL’s were added to a sephadex column and centrifuged for 3 to 3.5 minutes
at 700 to 900 RPM in a CRU-5000 centrifuge. The column flow-through was collected
and this was used for inoculation into the 10’2 wells and also serial ten-fold dilutions were
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carried out in maintenance media (i.e. 0.2mL of a virus/test substance dilution was added
to 1.8mL of maintenance media). A total of 0.2 mL of each dilution was aseptically
pipetted into each of four wells of host cells. The assay plates were incubated at 35°C +
2.5°C plus 5% C02 and the cells were observed for toxicity or characteristic viral CPE
throughout the assay. Refeedings were performed the same as above.
RNA Purification
After infectivity tests were completed these samples were collected for RT-PCR
assays. Samples to be tested were thawed and 0.5ml of sample was added to a 1.5mL
epindorf tube, using RNase free materials as necessary throughout, with 0.5ml of trizol
(Gibco BRL, Gaithersburg, Maryland, USA) was added. Samples were mixed by pipeting
up and down repeatedly and then incubated at room temperature for 5 minutes. After
incubation, 0.1ml of chloroform (J.T. Baker Inc., Phillipsburg, NJ, USA) was added,
shaken vigorously for 10 seconds and incubated at room temperature for 2 minutes. At
4°C, the sample was centrifuged for 15 minutes at 12000 rpm. After centrifugation the
aqueous top phase was transferred to another 1.5 ml epindorf tube and 0.25 ml of
isopropyl alcohol (Curtin Matheson Scientific, Houston, TX, USA) was added and
incubated at room temperature for 15 minutes. Samples were centrifuged at 4°C for 10
minutes at 12000 rpm. The supernatant was removed and 1ml of 75% ethanol (Carolina
Biological Supply Company, Burlington, NC, USA) was added, vortexed, and spun for 5
minutes at 7500 rpm at 4°C. The supernatant was removed and spun at 12000 rpm for 5
minutes. The supernatant was removed again and 50pl of RNase free water (Promega,
Madison, WI, USA) was added to the tube.
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RT-PCR Reaction
The Brilliant® SYBR® Green QRT-PCR Master Mix Kit, one step reaction was
used and a RNase free procedure was followed throughout. A master mix was prepared
for each 10 reactions using 74.4k of RNase free water (Promega, Madison, WI, USA),
0.625 X of StrataScript RT/RNase block enzyme mixture (Strategene, San Diego, CA,
USA) and 125k of 2x SYBR QRT-PCR master mix (Strategene, San Diego, CA, USA).
Reactions were set-up to contain varying amounts of purified RNA and different primer
sets. The three primer sets are used are described below.
1) IN-2: GGG TTG GGA CTA TCC TAA GTG TGA (6.66 nmole)
IN-4: TAA CAC ACA AAC ACC ATC ATC ATC A (9.3 nmole)
2) IN-6: GGT TGG GAC TAT CCT AAG TGT GA (6.91 nmole)
IN-7: CCA TCA TCA GAT AGA ATC ATC ATA (8.51 nmole)
3) BNIoutS2: ATG AAT TAC CAA GTC AAT GGT TAC (6.02 nmole)
BNIoutAS: CAT AAC CAG TCG GTA CAG CTA (8.09 nmole)
All primers were diluted 1:100 with the addition of RNase free water.
RT-PCR reactions were set-up for a total of 25k in each reaction tube. Reaction tubes
either contained 0k, IX or 3k of purified RNA with \X of each primer from the primer set,
20 X of master mix and if necessary RNase free water to total the reaction to 25X.
RT-PCR cycling program as follows: 1 cycle for 30 minutes at 45°C, 1 cycle for 10
minutes at 95 °C and 40 cycles with 30 seconds of denaturing at 95 °C, 1 minute of
annealing at 60°C and 30 seconds of extension at 72°C.
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Results
In order to determine the effectiveness of common household disinfectants and
antiseptics on a SARS-like Coronavirus, MHV was analyzed for its ability to infect cells
after treatment of household products used from North America, Europe and Asia.
Human Coronavirus 229E, from the antigenic Group I of the Coronaviridae, along with
its host, MRC-5 (Human lung cells) was used because this virus along with another type
of Human Coronavirus causes 30% of colds every year in humans. Initially, it was
planned to start with a virus that is known to cause infections in humans and then look at
an animal virus. During viral propagation it became apparent that the cytopathogenic
effect of Human Coronavirus 229E was not visible. Viral infection was performed three
to four times after cell passaging and still viral CPE was not present. It has been
previously determined that Human Coronavirus 229E has an established viral infection
that allows for the virus to replicate without a noticeable viral CPE for an undetermined
about of passages and therefore was not used throughout this study (4). Another
coronavirus, HCoV-OC43, did not produce a visible CPE in cell culture using BSC-1
cells because the host chosen was not adapted to tissue culture methods and therefore
could not be used. Further tests are necessary using other cell lines that will produce a
viral CPE in order to study the antiviral action of common household products against the
aforementioned types of Human Coronaviruses.
Murine Hepatitis Virus and its Cytopathogenic Effect
The presence of Murine Hepatitis Virus (MHV) infection was detected by
observing viral cytopathogenic effect (CPE) of the NCTC clone 1469 cell line through an
inverted microscope. CPE can occur because of toxicity of the product to the cells or
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because of the presence of viral particles. The difference between viral CPE and
cytotoxicity CPE can be determined by the controls that are performed during the test.
Figure 1 demonstrates the cell line 8 hours after being passaged and only 50% confluent.
The cells are healthy with rounding and a distinct morphology. Figure 2 - shows the cell
line after 36 hours of being passaged and 80% confluent. Figure 3 indicates viral CPE
and the effect the MHV has on the NCTC clone 1469 cell line. The cells no longer have
that distinct form and structure causing degeneration of the cell sheet.

Figure 1: NCTC clone 1469 cells after 8 hours of cell passaging

Figure 2: NCTC clone 1469 cells after 36 hours of cell passaging
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Figure 3: NCTC clone 1469 cells infected with MHV

Disinfectant and Antiseptic Products
Since successful viral propagation occurred with MHV this virus was used to
measure the antiviral properties of various household disinfectants and antiseptics. A list
of the products tested, the dilutions used during testing and the yielding concentrations is
outlined in Table 1. The products chosen were based on their use in specific parts of the
world, especially those affected by the 2003 SARS outbreak, and also by the varying
active ingredients to determine the virucidal activity. It is important to note that most of
the products tested were dilutables and require a specific dilution to be effective. The
dilutions were chosen based on manufacturer’s instructions, except for the liquid hand
soap. The liquid hand soap dilution was chosen to allow for the thick product to be dilute
enough to assess its efficacy but not too dilute that invalid test results would be obtained.
A 30 seconds contact time was used because this was the quickest time one operator can
perform while carrying out the EPA virucidal test method.
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Table 1 - Product Summary with the Concentration of the Active Ingredient

Product

Active Ingredient

Dilution

Final
Concentration
Tested

Location of
Product

Lysol
Disinfectant
Spray®
Dettol Brown
Liquid
Antiseptic /
Disinfectant®
Household
bleach
Clean &
Smooth Soap®

0.1% alkyl dimethyl benzyl
ammonium saccharinate /
79% ethanol

N/A

1OOOppm /
790,000ppm

North
America

4.8% chloroxylenol
(PCMX)

1:40

1200 ppm

Europe and
Asia

5.25% sodium hypochlorite

1:25

2100 ppm

All

0.2% triclosan

1:4

500 ppm

Pine-Sol®

15.0% pine oil

1:64

2343 ppm

North
America
North
America

EPA Virucidal Test Method Requirements and Test Results
Evaluation of the effectiveness of the products being tested and the validity of the
assay were accepted when the following criteria were met:
1. A minimum viral titer of 104 was recovered from the test surface (i.e. virus control).
2. Inactivation of the virus by the test substance at all dilutions as measured by the viral
CPE not being present (i.e. the cells with the viral/test substance suspension).
3. When cytotoxicity was observed in the test system, at least a 3 log reduction in the
viral titer had to be demonstrated.
4. The host cells remained healthy and viable throughout the course of the assay period as
determined by the control wells which did not have any viral suspension or product added
to the cells.
An EPA test method only requires a product to be tested once with two
replicates in order to be proven affective. However, in order to achieve an 80%
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confidence interval, it was determined that the products should be tested five times with
two replicates for each test (Table 2).
Table 2 - Raw Data: Reduction in Virus infectivity after a 30 second contact time;
Calculations were done using the Reed and Muench ID50 endpoint (42)

Product
Lysol Disinfectant
Spray®
(alkyl dimethyl
benzyl ammonium
saccharinate /
ethanol)
Dettol Brown
Liquid Antiseptic/
Disinfectant®
(PCMX)
Household Bleach
(sodium
hypochlorite)

Clean & Smooth®
(triclosan)

5.50
5.50
5.50
5.50

no
no
no
no

CPE due to
toxicity of
product
<2.50
<2.50
<2.50
<2.50

Test 5*: 5.50

no

<2.50

>3.00

Test 1: 5.67
Test 2: 6.00
Test 3: 6.00
Test 4: 6.00
Test 5: 6.00
Test 1: 5.50
Test 2: 6.00
Test 3: 6.00
Test 4: 6.00
Test 5: 6.00
Test 1*: 6.33
Test 2*: 6.33
Test 3*: 6.33
Test 4*: 6.33

no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no
no

>4.17
>4.50
>4.50
>4.50
>4.50
>4.00
>4.50
>4.50
>4.50
>4.50
>4.83
>4.74
>4.33
>4.83

Test 5: 5.50

no

<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.59
<2.00
<1.50
<2.50 (no
sephadex)
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50
<1.50

MHV
Recovery
Test 1*:
Test 2*:
Test 3*:
Test 4*:

Virus Present:
rep.l and rep. 2

no
Test 1: 5.67
no
Test 2: 6.00
Pine-Sol®
no
Test 3: 6.00
(pine oil)
no
Test 4: 5.50
no
Test 5: 5.50
*Test procedure performed using sephadex columns.

Log
Reduction
>3.00
>3.00
>3.00
>3.00

>3.00
>4.17
>4.50
>4.50
>4.00
>4.00

The CPE due to the toxicity effect of the product was determined 24 hours after
the test and was based on two controls. The virus controls performed had varying
dilutions of the virus and plated into the multi-well assay plates containing the preferred
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cell line. This control did not contain any product and determined the CPE due to the
presence of the virus. The toxicity controls had the product at varying dilutions, no. virus
present, and plated into the assay plates. This determined the CPE due to the presence of
the toxicity from the product.
When a 3-log reduction of the virus could not be achieved, sephadex, as noted
in Table 2, was performed with Lysol Disinfectant Spray® and Clean and Smooth
Soap®. This occurred due to the product cytotoxicity and not because of the effectiveness
of the product. The sephadex column has a cross-linked dextran bases resin that produces
an affinity for lipids and reduces the amount of active that has a cytotoxicity affect on the
cell line. Sephadex columns are used after neutralization has occurred and are even used
for the virus and toxicity controls. Therefore, the product is being assayed for it’s efficacy
at this point and there will not be any considerations to the further diluting of the active.
Calculations were performed using the Reed and Muench ID50 endpoint method.
This calculation method can only be performed on viruses that cause CPE in cultured
cells and an adequate amount of incubation time is given to allow for infection to take
place. The samples being tested for infectivity were diluted and inoculated into the NCTC
clone 1469 cell line. Four replicates were performed for each dilution. In order to
calculate the endpoint the cumulative number of infected and uninfected were reported in
percentages. These numbers were used to calculate the proportionate distance factor
which in turn was used along with the dilution factors to figure out the endpoint.
At least a 3-log reduction along with the inactivation of the virus from all
dilutions are two of the requirements that are important at determining a product effective
against a virus and necessary to attain EPA registration status.
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A summary of the averages of the five tests for each product has been outlined
in table 3. This table demonstrates that in fact all of the common household disinfectants /
antiseptics were effective at eliminating viral particles from a hard non-porous surface by
providing a 3-log reduction or greater of the virus from the surface.
Table 3 - Averages of the Virus Recovery, the amount of wells present with viral
particles, average log reduction and the final result
Product
Lysol Disinfectant Spray®
(alkyl dimethyl benzyl
ammonium saccharinate /
ethanol)
Dettol Brown Liquid
Antiseptic / Disinfectant®
(PCMX)
Household Bleach
(sodium hypochlorite)
Clean and Smooth®
(triclosan)
Pine-Sol®
(pine oil)

Result

MHV
Recovery
5.50

Virus Present Average Log
Reduction
in any wells
>3.00
No

5.93

No

>4.43

Effective

5.90

No

>4.40

Effective

6.16

No

>4.35

Effective

5.73

No

>4.23

Effective

Effective

The log reductions obtained from the certain active and its concentration along
with the amount of log reduction achieved is illustrated in figure 4. The lower the log
reduction does not mean that the product was less effective because some of the dilutions
were eliminated due to cellular toxicity of the product and not viral CPE.
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Figure 4 - A comparison of the log reductions of the common household disinfectant
/ antiseptic products used against MHV
Average Log Reduction

■ Lysol Disinfectant Spray

■ Dettol Liquid Antiseptic - Disinfectant

□ Household bleach

■ Clean and Smooth

■ Pine-Sol

The research showed that Lysol Disinfectant Spray® (0.1% alkyl dimethyl
benzyl ammonium saccharinate and 79% ethanol), Dettol Liquid Antiseptic Disinfectant® (chloroxylenol B.P. 4.8%), household bleach (5.25% sodium
hypochlorite), Clean & Smooth Soap® (0.2% triclosan) and Pine-Sol® (pine oil 15%)
were effective against MHV. The reduction in virus titer for the test substance was
greater than or equal to 3 logs of inactivation and the virus titer recovered from the carrier
exceeded 104. All products demonstrated complete inactivation of the MHV at all
dilutions assayed. This research has proven that when used properly, common household
disinfectants will eliminate Murine Hepatitis Virus particles from the surface.
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Table 4: Products tested outside of the recommended dilution
Product

Dilution

Lysol Disinfectant Spray®
(alkyl dimethyl benzyl
ammonium saccharinate /
ethanol)
Dettol Brown Liquid
Antiseptic / Disinfectant®
(PCMX)
Household Bleach
(sodium hypochlorite)
Clean and Smooth®
(triclosan)
Pine-Sol®
(pine oil)

1:10

Result
Virus
Present in
any wells
Not Effective
Yes

1:1000

No

Effective

1:250

Yes

Not Effective

1:25

Yes

Not Effective

1:1000

No

Effective

The disinfectants and antiseptics were also tested outside of the recommended
dilution to assess how effective the products would be against MHV if they were not used
correctly. This information is useful to know for infection control procedures because this
indicates how far the product can be diluted before loss of efficacy. As one can see Dettol
Liquid® and Pine-Sol® contain actives that remain active even at very high dilutions.
Household bleach being one of the most common products used for infection control
becomes ineffective as a virucidal agent against MHV if not diluted properly. Lysol
Disinfectant Spray® and Clean and Smooth® were also not effective at eliminating
MHV from the surface when used incorrectly. Lysol Disinfectant Spray® is not a
dilutable product but in order to obtain data a sample was collected in a tube by spraying
for 10 to 15 seconds and then it was further diluted.
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RT-PCR Results
Table 5: RT-PCR data
Primer Set
1: IN-2 and IN-4

Ct of Opl RNA
26.26

Ct of lpl RNA
24.14

Ct of 3pl RNA
24.55

2: IN-6 and IN-7
3: BNIoutS2 and
BNIoutAS
1 (rep. 2)
2 (rep.2)
3 (rep.2)

30.95
28.09

26.59
27.31

25.11
27.98

25.83
29.98
27.91

25.35
23.87
28.06

17.51
22.02
28.38

The RT-PCR data is represented by the amount of cycles necessary for the
fluorescence to be detected passed a set threshold. Three sets of primers were used to
detect which primer set would be the best at replicating the MHV RNA used in these
experiments. The MHV controls were used a varying amounts (i.e. 0, 1 and 3 pi) and the
one step SYBR reaction was used. The more amount of RNA that is present the less time
or cycles it would take for that sample to fluoresce passed the threshold. Therefore one
would expect the Ct values to decrease when more MHV RNA is present. A greater than
five Ct value between the no template control and the varying amounts of templates is
used to deem valid results and represents a 32 fold difference. This difference is
consistently only seen in primer set #2 for both replicates from the Opl to the lpl of MHV
RNA and would be considered the best option of primer sets to use throughout the other
RT-PCR reactions.
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Conclusion
The 2003 outbreak of Severe Acute Respiratory Syndrome (SARS) infected
over 8,000 people and killed 784 leaving many questions to how effective are household
disinfectants and antiseptics at eliminating viral particles from surfaces and preventing
transmission. This research proved that Lysol Disinfectant Spray®, Pine-Sol®, Clean &
Smooth Antibacterial Soap®, Dettol Liquid ® (a brand well-known and frequently used
in parts of the world where the SARS outbreak occurred) and household bleach were
effective against Murine Hepatitis Virus (MHV), a virus that is closely related to SARS.
In an outbreak caused by novel agents, such as SARS, it is important to know
the effectiveness of disinfectants/antiseptics to prevent or reduce the possibility of
human- to-human transmission by means of surfaces. However, there are many safety
precautions that have to be followed when testing the SARS virus, making it difficult to
prove the efficacy of these preventative reagents.
Because many viruses are dangerous to work with, a surrogate virus is often
identified to study with. Genetic analysis performed on SARS identified the virus as a
member of the Coronavirus family. Coronaviruses in general are more commonly
associated with causing respiratory and enteric diseases and in humans causes 30 % of
mild upper respiratory tract infections (4). MHV was chosen as a surrogate virus because
it demonstrates a close relation to SARS from the Coronavirus family and also, because
of the accomplished viral CPE in cell culture. This allowed for proficiency during testing
and enabled consistent results. MHV would serve as a predictor of how household
disinfectants and antiseptics would perform against SARS.
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This data shows that common household disinfectants and antiseptics are
effective at eliminating MHV from surfaces using a method that closely follows the
guidelines established by the federal government for a standard virucidal assay. All
household products tested demonstrated a >99.9% inactivation of MHV. Therefore a
connection can be made that if household cleaners are effective at eliminating MHV from
surfaces then they should also be effective at inactivating the SARS virus. This
demonstrates the ability that disinfectants and antiseptics have at preventing transmission
of viruses via surfaces when used correctly. Also, a study performed with free chlorine
and chlorine dioxide demonstrated its abilities at inactivating the SARS virus. The
concentrations that succeeded at inactivating the SARS virus were not the same for gram
negative organisms such as E. coli and proved that SARS is more susceptible to
disinfectants then E. coli (21). It also states the importance of diluting the product
correctly and letting it sit the correct about of time to allow for inactivation of the virus.
Chlorine used at 10 mg/L with a contact time of 30 minutes produced a 100%
inactivation of SARS but if that contact time was only 1 minute then only a 43.77%
inactivation could be demonstrated (21).
Two of the products in this report were sent to a lab overseas to confirm this
data but testing with the SARS-Urbani strain was used instead of MHV. The method
aforementioned was used as a guideline as the labs were testing these products. Lysol
Disinfectant Spray® and Dettol Liquid - Antiseptic and Disinfectant® were tested
against the Urbani SARS virus at a 30 seconds and a 5 minute contact time. The same
techniques were used against the SARS virus and as predicted the same results (i.e. a
99.9% reduction) were achieved by both products.
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During the outbreak many of the other surrogate viruses (e.g. Human
Coronavirus 229E and Human Coronavirus OC43) were backordered for months and
when testing begun there were some difficulties with achieving CPE in cell culture.
Therefore this allowed initiation of the infectivity tests to be performed against MHV.
Samples from each test were stored frozen at -75°C to be used for RT-PCR analysis. This
analysis will be useful in determining the mechanism of action, determining if RNA is
still present and if present why it did not produce positive infectivity results in cell
culture. The RT-PCR data thus far has helped to determine a primer set to be used to
perform subsequent analysis on the frozen samples from each of the tests.
In less than four months, from the point of when a global alert was issued in
March of 2003 to July 5th of 2003 it was declared that SARS was successfully contained.
This is an attributable mark for which the scientific community handled an outbreak from
a novel agent, not knowing the causative agent, not having any diagnostic tests or
available treatments and even without proven effective infection control procedures. One
can see the importance of an international collaboration during an outbreak. The SARS
outbreaks lead to clinical, epidemiology and laboratory research worldwide. The global
collaboration eventually led to the termination of SARS transmission. Other efforts that
are still taking place are the determination of the origin of the SARS virus, its natural
host, development of a vaccine or other antiviral compounds to treat the SARS virus and
diagnostic tests to assist with rapid and reliable identification. This research has proven
the advantages of a surrogate virus during an outbreak of a new and emerging virus. The
information learned from the surrogate can be used to help with the understandings of the
current unknowns of the new virus.
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